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1. INTRODUCTION
This report is an Overall Executive Summary of work accomplished
from 1 September 1973 through 31 August 1974 on the three Advanced Space
Program Studies covered by NASA Contract NASW-2575. Table 1-1 lists
the studies, their funding, and The Aerospace Corporation MTS deliveries.
Table 1-1. Advanced Space Program Studies
Study Title Funding MTS
Man Months
2.1 Operations Analysis $362, 5001 72. 5
2.2 Shuttle User Analysis $520,0002 91.0
2.3 Systems Cost/Performance $325, 000 72. 7
Analysis
1Includes $12, 500 transferred from Study 2.2.
2 Includes $25, 000 allocated to special study on "NASA Long Range Plan-
ning" and $20, 000 for additional BRAVO analyses on alternate ways to
operate the EOS with the Shuttle. This latter study was initiated
30 August 1974 in support of GSFC and will be reported to NASA sepa-
ately upon completion.
.The objective of these studies was to provide NASA with advanced
planning analyses which relate integrated space program goals and options
to credible technical capabilities, applications potential, and funding re-
sources. Both NASA and DOD requirements and plans were to be considered
in these analyses. The DOD planning related to the Advanced Space Program
Studies was primarily in the areas of interim upper stage planning and
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on-orbit payload servicing. In addition, the NASA Long Range Planning
Study, initiated on 1 July as a special study task of Study 2. 2, is examining
potential military, as well as civilian, advanced mission concepts in the
context of mission models as reported in ATR-74(7344)- 1.
Although all elements of the NASA space program were included
in the Statement of Work, the studies concentrated on upper stage options
for the Space Transportation System (STS) based on payload considerations,
space servicing and standardization of payloads, payload operations, STS
economic analyses related to user charges and new space applications,
and a significant extension of the payload cost/performance model initiated
in FY 73. In general, all of the basic FY 74 activities were included in
the FY 73 effort but were examined in mtich greater detail in FY 74; the
NASA Long Range Planning Study was a new start.
The three studies performed this year were selected to provide
NASA with additional planning data on lower cost space operations in the
Shuttle era in the areas of:
I. Operational approaches leading to lower space program
costs through more efficient utilization of the STS by pay-loads, primarily through payload modularization and
standardization. These payload design concepts, in turn,
indicated the economic desirability of space servicingNASA payloads with the STS.
2. Economic analyses of the STS related to: (a) chargepolicies to be applied by NASA to the user, and (b) new
uses of space which would be competitive with terrestrial
systems because of the lower operating costs of the STS
and the ability of the STS to achieve high systems
availability.
3. Cost analyses to develop a more accurate method of relatingpayload costs to payload performance characteristics. The
method being analyzed considers payloads at the assemblylevel rather than at the subsystem level used in previous
costing approaches. It also uses catalog item data, wherepossible, rather than cost estimating relationships based
primarily on subsystem weight.
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Data developed on the three studies were used to the maximum *
possible extent on the other studies. Thus, Study 2.2 was able to take
advantage of the modularized payload data developed in Study 2. 1 as inputs
for the standardization task (Task 3) of Study 2.2.
On an interagency level, the DORCA program developed in FY 73
Study 2. 5 continued to be used by SAMSO to perform payload capture analyses
for the DOD upper stage utility assessment. It is intended that the capability
to cost out payloads using the Systems Cost/Performance Model of Study 2. 3
be transferred to SAMSO, once the utility of the Model has been adequately
demonstrated. It should be noted, however, that cost/performance data
derived from DOD payloads now comprise a major portion of the data base
for the Cost/Performance Model.
As a result of the work accomplished during FY 74 on Contract
NASW-2575, it will be possible to use information developed on most of
the FY 74 studies for wider ranging but related studies in FY 75. Study 2. 1,
which will be investigating man's role in space operations in FY 75, will be
able to use the information developed in FY 74 on automated space servicing
of payloads as a point of departure. Since Study 2.2 will be examining a
completely new area next year, it will be unable to use most of the data
developed in FY 74. Study 2.3 will be aimed primarily at getting an updated
computer program of the Systems Cost/Performance Model into operation
at MSFC. FY 75 Study 2.4 will be a new study on the impact of payload
subsystem standardization for the Low Cost Payloads Office (KC) at NASA
Headquarters. Study 2.5 will be a direct continuation of the effort initiated
on 1 July 1974 on NASA Long Range Planning.
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2. STUDY TEAM
Table 2-1 lists The Aerospace Corporation and NASA study
directors for the three studies performed under Contract NASW-2575 as
well as the NASA review team members who helped guide these studies.
Table 2 -1. Study Management
Study Managers
Study Aerospace NASA Review Members
2.1 R. Wolfe HQ/V. Huff MSFC/J. Steincamp
2.2 E. Pritchard HQ/W. Moore MSFC/J. Turner
2.2.2 E. Pritchard GSFC/Cepollina
2.2.3.4 I. Bekey HQ/R. Freitag HQ/F. Roberts
2.3 B. Campbell HQ/R. Carley MSFC/O. Green
MSFC/R. Kramer B. Shelton
J. Steincarnp
M. Teal
M. Vanhook
2-1
3. REPORTS ISSUED
The results of the Studies performed under Contract NASW-2575
are documented in the following reports.
ATR-74(7341)-i Description of the Attitude Control, 5 April 1974
Guidance and Navigation Space Replaceable
Units for Automated Space Servicing of
Selected NASA Missions
ATR-74(7341)-2 Operations Analysis (Study 2. 1) 28 June 1974
Program SEPSIM (Solar Electric
Propulsion Stage Simulation)
ATR-74(7341)-3 Operations Analysis (Study 2. 1) 30 June 1974
Payload Designs for Space Servicing
ATR-74(7341)-4 Operations Analysis (Study 2. 1) 15 July 1974
Shuttle Upper Stage Software Requirements
ATR-74(7341)-5 Operations Analysis (Study 2. 1) 15 July 1974
Contingency Analysis
ATR-74(7341)-6 Operations Analysis (Study 2. 1) 30 September
Program Manual and Users Guide for 1974
the LOVES Computer Code
ATR-74(7341)-7 Operations Analysis (Study 2. 1) 30 September
Program Listing for the LOVES 1974
Computer Code
ATR-74(7341)-8 Operations Analysis (Study 2. 1) 30 September
Final Report 1974
Volume I - Executive Summary
Volume II - Space Servicing Tradeoffs
ATR-74(7342)-1 Shuttle User Analysis (Study 2.2) 30 September
Final Report 1974
Volume I - Executive Summary
Volume II - User Charge Analysis
Part 1 - Summary
Part 2 - The Analysis
Part 3 - Tabulated Results
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ATR-74(7342)-1 Shuttle User Analysis (Study 2. 2) 30 September
Final Report 1974
Volume III - Business Risk and Value of
Operations in Space (BRAVO)
Part 1 - BRAVO Summary
Part 2 - BRAVO Manual
Part 3 - BRAVO Worksheets
Part 4 - BRAVO Computer Program
and Reference Data
Part 5 - Analysis of GSFC Earth 30 December
Observation Satellite (EOS) 1974
System Mission Model
Volume IV - Standardized Subsystem 30 September
Modules 1974
ATR-74(7343)-1 Systems Cost/Performance Analysis 27 September
(Study 2. 3) Final Report 1974
Volume I - Executive Summary
Volume II - Systems Cost/Performance Model
Volume II, Appendix A - Data Base
Volume III - Program Manual and Users Guide
ATR-74(7344)-l Long Range Planning Study 19 September
Volume I - Progress Report 1974
Volume II - Study Plan
ATR-74(7449)-1 Advanced Space Program Studies, 30 September
Overall Executive Summary 1974
The following addendum contains supplementary reliability data
the payloads studied in Study 2. 1.
ATR 74(7341)-3 ADD. 30 September
1974
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4. OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
(STUDY 2. 1)
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Study 2. 1, Operations Analysis, had as its principal objective
the investigation of new operational concepts for the Shuttle era. Attention
was directed primarily at space servicing of automated payload programs
and the impact this could have on upper stage designs and overall resources
utilization. Although this is not an economics study, cost benefits result-
ing from space servicing can be determined in a gross sense so that the
concept can be pursued further within NASA, or included in detail design
studies with other contractors.
To perform this study it was necessary to develop an entirely
new data base and analysis technique.
Candidate payloads were selected from the October 1973 NASA
Mission Model of Automated Payload Opportunities and reconfigured for
space servicing. This design process resulted in a set of standard space
replaceable units (SRUs) which serve as the building blocks of each service-
able payload. Mission equipment for each candidate payload was also
reconfigured for space servicing.
A complex computer simulation program was developed to sup-
port the analysis of space servicing. This statistical program employs
Monte Carlo techniques to establish failure events which then require ser-
vicing by the Space Shuttle with an upper stage to put the payloads back in
an operating condition. Various upper stage configurations can be employed
in the analysis. The computer program has been implemented for NASA
use at the NASA Computation Facility, Slidell, Louisiana.
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Although space servicing of automated payloads appears to be
attractive for individual programs, it has not been shown that its applica-
tion in a broad sense would be beneficial. Since servicing operations
are random in nature, they may place severe demands on the logistic fleet
which could otherwise be occupied by other operations such as Sorties.
Consequently, the total mission model must be considered and the following
questions assessed:
1. Can the total number of flights be reduced by space
servicing of payloads ?
2. Can the total payload procurement be reduced ?
3. Are the benefits sufficient to justify the DDT&E costs
and the risk associated with developing a new concept?
4.2 STUDY APPROACH
The study effort was divided into several subtasks, all associated
with developing data for subsequent tradeoff analyses. The most important
of these was the development of a space serviceable payload data base.
Information from several detailed payload redesign efforts was employed
together with the results of this study to provide a composite of subsystem
and mission equipment weights, volumes, and reliabilities. This new data
base has been issued as an Aerospace report ATR-74(7341)-3. A summary
of the content is provided below.
The subsystem requirements for 42 payload programs were eval-
uated to establish the range over which any set of standard equipment would
have to perform. Five subsystem categories were selected: Attitude and
Velocity Control, Guidance and Navigation, Telemetry and Command,
Data Processing, and Electrical Power. Certain high reliability components
were incorporated with the basic structure of. each payload to form a non-
replaceable unit (NRU). This was the framework within which the space
replaceable units (SRUs) could be inserted and removed as required for
servicing. Mission equipments were also placed upon SRU baseplates to
be replaced as desired.
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This information was then used to reconfigure an example satel-
lite for space servicing. The selected design was the NASA Earth Observatory
Satellite (EOS). The baseline definition is shown along with its reconfigured
version'in Figure 4-1. The mission equipment modules are principally
located around the periphery of the ring frame to allow for future growth
of equipment. Subsystem modules, where the size can be controlled, are
located inside the ring frame. This general configuration was then employed
for the remaining space serviceable payload candidates. In all, 29 different
designs were developed to satisfy the 42 payload programs. Thirty-four
different subsystem SRUs were required along with 104 mission equipment
modules. In general, the weight growth for payloads over 1000 kg (current
design) was 30 to 40 percent.
Another subtask effort addressed the cost of implementing soft-
ware for upper stage space servicing operations. The fundamental question
involved the additional complexity associated with automated rendezvous,
docking, reinitialization and transfer to another position in orbit for further
servicing. The approach taken for this task was to develop software require-
ments for space servicing of automated payloads in conjunction with a costing
technique that could be related to the requirement set. This effort covered
all phases of software development and recurring operations except crew
training and simulation. Manned interactive support was assumed for only
contingency situations and visual inspection of the payload.
The results of this subtask have been published in two Aerospace
reports, ATR-74(7341)-4 and ATR-74(7341)-5. In summary, including such
factors as integration, design complexity, etc.,.it was determined that
those functions required for space servicing increased the software costs
by less than 10 percent. The total DDT&E cost for spaceborne, ground
checkout, and flight support (MCC) operations should not exceed $20 million.
Space Servicing would add another $2 million to this value. Recurring costs
should not exceed $2. 5 million per year for. all functions. These costs are
estimated to be between 5 and 10 percent of the upper stage development costs.
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4.3 SPACE SERVICING TRADEOFFS
The fundamental tradeoff which was performed addressed the
cost of space servicing of automated payloads versus expendable and ground
refurbishable payload design concepts. In addition, various upper stages
were considered to determine if space servicing is sensitive to the selection
of an upper stage. Upper stage candidates employed in this study were the
Titan IIIC Transtage, the Transtage with a kick motor, a 28-foot large
tank Centaur, the full capability Tug and a Centaur/SEPS (Solar Electric
Propulsion Stage) combination.
The results presented here have been limited to geosynchronous
orbit payloads. Further effort is required to place the remaining orbits
of interest in proper perspective. There are 23 different payload programs
scheduled for geosynchronous orbit in the time period of 1980 through 1990
(11 years), Sixty-one percent are COMSAT-type programs, 30 percent are
earth observations, and 9 percent are Explorer-type programs. The total
number of operational payloads in geosynchronous orbit at any given time
ranges between 30 and 40.
The servicing process consists of recording when a failure event
occurs in each payload deployed to geosynchronous orbit. The replacement
SRU is then placed in a loading queue to await delivery to the payload of
interest. As other failures occur, the process of loading is continued.
When a full load, compatible with the Shuttle and the upper stage under
investigation, is achieved, the combined load is delivered to orbit. The
payloads are then placed in an operational state to await the next failure
event. This procedure is repeated through a Monte Carlo process to arrive
at a statistical distribution of SRU replacements and logistic vehicle
operations. Cost estimates can then be implied by equivalent payload
procurement and vehicle launch costs.
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The results of this simulation effort are shown in Figure 4-2
indicating the degree to which each payload is serviced over the time
period of interest (1980 - 1990). This curve shows that each space ser-
viceable payload required at least a six percent replacement of equipment,
and that 20 percent of the payloads required, on the average, a replacement
of approximately 40 percent of their equipment. The results are related to
the NASA full capability Tug but only slight changes occur when other
upper stages are employed. The average payload availability is also
shown indicating that, in general, a value above 95 percent is readily achiev-
able without the use of orbital spares or dedicated logistic oper ations. An
in depth analysis is required if availabilities above 99 percent are desired,
as is the case with commercial communication satellites.
Of the total payloads deployed during this time period, 32 were
space serviceable. Nine of these payloads had failures of non-replaceable
units, thereby forcing a total payload replacement for continued operations.
In addition, on the average, over 145 space replaceable units (SRUs) were
replaced, representing an equivalent payload procurement of 10 additional
payloads. The total procurement of space serviceable payloads is therefore
estimated to be approximately 51 payloads. In addition, during this same
time period, approximately 14 expendable payloads (not suitable for space
servicing) were deployed, providing a total payload procurement of 65
payloads to fulfill the geosynchronous operations objectives of the October
1973 Mission Model. If space servicing were not employed, a total pro-
curement of 98 expendable payloads would be required to provide the same
level of support to operational programs.
These results are summarized in Table 4-1 for various upper
stage configurations. The baseline case is taken as the Transtage/kick
motor operation which recovers the T ranstage, but employs expendable
payload designs. The required number of flights is reduced as the per-
formance capability of the selected upper stage is increased. In performing
the analysis, a reduction of one Shuttle flight was assumed to provide a savings
in cost of operations of ten million dollars. However,, in certain cases, it was
necessary to expend the upper stage resulting in additional procurement costs.
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Figure 4-2 - Simulation Results
Table 4- 1 - Simulation Results
OPTIONS OPERATIONS APPROXIMATE BENEFITS *
SPACE PL / 6 6 SSTAGE EXP REC SERV FLTS PROC FLTS PLS STGs SEPS COST $M
TRANS/KICK V No 83 96 19/83* - o
TRANSTAGE No 54 99 29 -3 54 - 93
O CENTAUR V No 64 98 19 -2 - - 273
W FULLCAP. TUG No 61 99 22 -3 - 293
SCENTAUR Yes 86 63 -3 33 23 - 219**
FULL CAP. TUG V Yes 54 64 29 32 2 - 693
CENTAUR/SEPS V Yes 37 63 46 33 - - 3 833
FCT/SEPS V Yes 36 64 47 32 - 2 853
Reference Cost Data
Shuttle/Tug Flt $10.0 M
Benefits to be Applied Against Transtage 5.0 M
* DDT&E - Payloads and Stages Kick Motor 0. 1 M
* Recurring Refurbishment Costs Centaur 8.0 M
* Additional Mission Ops. Support Full Cap. Tug 10.0 M
Nineteen Transtages expended SEPS Stage Cost 0.0 MAvg. Payload Cost 10.0 M
Function of propellant boiloff.
See page 4-8 for discussion
SEPS data extracted from manual calculations
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For example, if the Transtage were expended to deploy payloads, the total
number of flights would be reduced from 83 to 54 (35%), saving approxi-
mately $290 million in flight costs but forcing the purchase of an extra
35 upper stages at approximately $5 million each. As a result, the overall
return after eleven years of operation still favors expending the Transtage
over the baseline mode by as much as $93 million. This reflects the fact
that even though the baseline mode of operations normally recovers the
Transtage, on the average it was necessary to expend 19 stages, in addition
to the kick motors, because payload weights were sufficiently high that
stage recovery could not be achieved.
For expendable payload operations, a large tank, 28-ft long
Centaur, has sufficient performance to deploy all the payloads in the mission
model without the need to expend any of the Centaurs. A further small reduc-
tion in the number of Shuttle flights results from the use of the full capability
Tug, again without expending any propulsive stages. The return on invest-
ment over the 11-year period is essentially the same for both vehicles
although the DDT&E is considerably greater for the Tug. It is possible that
other high energy missions, such as planetary, may require the higher
performance of the full capability Tug. However, for expendable payload
operations in synchronous equatorial orbit, based on the reference mission
model, it would appear that a large tank Centaur is adequate.
Continuing with the results presented in Table 4-1, it can be seen
that space servicing offers significant cost benefits over expendable payload
ope rations.
The Centaur stage used in this space servicing analysis is based
on the current design and incurs a loss of 1454 kg (3200 lb) when used in a
seven-day mission. This penalty is very severe and results in a high flight
rate even though the number of procured payloads is reduced. It also re-
quires the expenditure of a significant number of stages to accommodate the
increased payload weights associated with space servicing. If the Centaur
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boiloff rate and other losses could be reduced by the addition of insulation
and by engineering modifications to reduce thermal leakage paths, its
orbital performance could be improved sufficiently to make it a viable
candidate for space se.rvicing. A reduction of 454 kg in the boiloff would
reduce the Shuttle flight rate as shown in Figure 4-3. Although this boiloff
rate is still considerably higher than for the Tug, it would result in a cost
saving of approximately $150 million due to the reduction in Shuttle flights.
Since the estimated DDT&E cost to achieve this reduced boiloff is less than
$10 million, it appears to be a worthwhile investment.
90 -
80 -
70
SHUTTLE/
UPPER STAGE
FLIGHTS
60
Reference Full Capability Tug Reference Centaur
50 Non-impulsive Losses Non-impulsive Lossest I
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 (Ib)
500 1000 1500 (kg)
PROPELLANT LOSS DUE TO BOILOFF
Figure 4-3. Impact of Boiloff on Centaur Capability
It is recommended that a thorough review of the Centaur design
be performed, preferably by the manufacturer, to assess its potential
capability (and associated costs) for space servicing since the Centaur
results are so sensitive to inert weight and orbital life.
It can be seen from Table 4-1 that the full capability Tug, which
is being designed to perform a seven-day orbital mission, can substantially
reduce the Shuttle flight rate, leading to a return on investment of approxi-
mately $700 million over the baseline case for the 11-year period.
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This significant cost saving is considered to be conservative
for several reasons. First, flight costs will probably be closer to $12
million per flight because of the additional upper stage functions. Second,
an average payload will probably cost more than $10 million. While com-
munication satellites currently cost approximately $7 million, other opera-
tional and scientific payloads, which are highly complex, are expected to
cost over $40 million each. Finally, no effort was made to optimize the
flight operations; as a result, payloads were serviced as failures occurred
without exercising priorities, leading to poor upper stage load factors of
only 65 percent.
Although further improvement could be achieved by additional
analysis, it is obvious that space servicing can offer a substantial payoff
in a relatively short period of time. An initial DDT&E investment of over
$100 million to achieve space serviceable payload configurations would be
returned in five to six years. Since a return on investments of this magni-
tude generally requires ten to twenty years, the cost benefits cannot be
ignored. Moreover, the average time for advancing technologies to create
a new generation of payload configurations has been found to be approximately
six years; thus, a given payload program can upgrade its payload configura-
tion and realize a return from space servicing within the first generation of
the program plan.
A further point of importance is the flexibility of design and opera-
tion that space servicing offers. Improvements in mission equipment can
be incorporated as they become available, rather than requiring a new pay-
load design. If a given program drops behind schedule or cost overruns
are imminent because of a single equipment item, the requirements can be.
relaxed to meet the initial deployment schedule knowing that an improved
version of the equipment can be installed on orbit at a later date. Since the
subsequent equipment replacement would only bear a fraction of the flight
cost, as compared to a total payload replacement, it may be possible to
reduce the total runout costs while at the same time meeting the initial
flight schedule.
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An alternative to increased orbital life time for the Centaur is
to couple its operation with that of a space-based Solar Electric Propulsion
Stage (SEPS). Although a complete analysis could not be performed, it is
possible to-extrapolate previous manual calculations to this mission model.
In this mode, the Centaur performs two functions: direct payload deploy-
ment of all payloads (including SRUs) not requiring a SEPS, and supply of
payloads to the SEPS when the Centaur performance will not allow geo-
synchronous operation. In this way, payloads requiring immediate servicing
could be accommodated by the Centaur whereas heavy payloads exceeding
the Centaur capability would employ a SEPS, making it unnecessary to
expend any Centaurs. The SEPS, after receiving paylcads and SRUs from
a single Centaur flight, then transfers from position to position to service
numerous payloads in orbit. Initial deployment and retrieval of the SEPS
is performed by the Centaur.
The reference SEPS is a 25 kw configuration with approximately
1360 kg (3000 lb) of mercury propellant, achieving a specific impulse of
3000 seconds. Although deployment and retrieval operations may require
20 to 30 days, the servicing time in geosynchronous orbit is quite competi-
tive with the full capability Tug, in the order of two to three days. As
shown in Table 4-1, the cost benefits exceed $800 million over the baseline
reference case. In this case, the Centaur is quite competitive with the full
capability Tug because orbital lifetime is not a problem. The additional
$100-150 million savings should be sufficient to cover adaptation of the SEPS
to space servicing, assuming that the SEPS is developed for planetary
operations. In fact, the benefits are such that it may be possible to compen-
sate for the total SEPS development cost, although further optimization
would be required to get definitive results.
4.4 CONCLUSIONS
Although a great deal of analysis is still needed, it is apparent
from the results developed in this study that space servicing should be
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pursued, especially for geosynchronous orbits. The potential benefits in
terms of costs, flexibility for equipment changes, and increased reliability
of operations more than compensate for the payload weight increase and the
associated investment required to develop this operational concept. How-
ever, it may be difficult to convince the payload users to take this step due
to a concern over the risk of developing the concept. Therefore, the follow-
ing recommendations are submitted.
4.5 RECOMMENDATIONS
One alternative is to initiate a pilot program prior to Shuttle
IOC to demonstrate the operational technique. It may be possible, using
the USAF Space Technology Program (STP), to develop a simple payload
experiment program that can be deployed with a replacement SRU after
sufficient information had been accumulated from the initial experiment.
The service unit could be derived from several options, using existing
equipments or prototype develovment items to maintain a low cost operation.
Experience with the servicing unit should be beneficial also because it will
aid in developing requirements and components for future upper stage oper-
ations, especially for rendezvous and docking operations.
The advantage of this pilot program lies in focusing attention on
a. new concept which must involve the payload user from the start. This
involvement should enhance standardization of subsystems by emphasizing
interface relationships and design guidelines.
While a pilot program will not completely overcome the payload
developer's reluctance to take the first step toward space servicing because
of uncertainty in the development risk, it should move the process much
closer to reality.
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5. SHUTTLE USER ANALYSIS
(STUDY 2. 2)
The Shuttle User Analysis consists of the following three tasks:
1. STS User Charge.Analysis
2. Business Risk and Value of Operations in Space (BRAVO)
3. Standardized Subsystem Module Analysis.
The STS User Charge Analysis considered the many possible
approaches to charging the payloads transported by the Space Shuttle and
upper stages. The Business Risk and Value of Operations in Space (BRAVO)
Analysis was concerned with the development and testing of sophisticated
techniques to rapidly determine the relative cost effectiveness of potential
future space systems. The Standardized Subsystem Module Analysis task
developed techniques and data which will generally predict the effects on
payload characteristics and costs of standardizing subsystem modules.
Each of these three studies is described below.
5. 1 STS USER CHARGE ANALYSIS
5. 1. 1 Objective
The objective of this study was to generate alternative STS flight
charge approaches which would provide a basis for determining a NASA STS
flight charge policy.
5.1.2 Approach
It is expected that STS flight modes will be so different from
current flight modes that the present charging policies may need
modifications; for example, multiple payloads and payloads returned to
earth will be common with the STS. Therefore, methods of pro-rating
transportation costs to each of the multiple payloads and charging for
payload return must be established.
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This study is a continuation of a low-level effort initiated in
FY 73. The FY 73 study brought the user charge problem into focus and
described many of the issues involved, based on testing STS charge options
numerically against evaluative criteria. The analyses of FY 73, based on
one or two typical flights, were expanded in FY 74 to initially include
analyses of an entire year's STS flights and then, in the final testing of
desirable charge approaches, the 12 years of STS flights as shown in the
October 1973 NASA mission model.
The FY 74 approach carried out the analysis in the following four
steps. First, criteria for the evaluation of the alternative flight charge
approaches were generated and then NASA approval was obtained for these
criteria. Next, some 260 alternative flight charge approaches were defined.
Payload transportation charges were calculated for 80 of these 260 charge
approaches. The resulting charges were then evaluated against the follow-
ing criteria and candidate flight charge approaches were recommended to
NASA.
1. The charges should recover at least the total costs of
Shuttle flights in the October 1973 mission model.
2. The charge policy should contain incentives for payload
effects implementation. Returned payload charges should
be competitive with the cost of new payloads.
3. The policy should provide incentives for STS operations
with high load factors.
4. The selection of the policy should be insensitive to mission
model changes.
5. Charges for the individual users who share a flight should
be a fair share of the total costs.
6. Charge rates should be competitive with expendable launch
vehicles.
7. The charge policy should be simple to administer.
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Contact was made with several tarifforganizations to obtain
information on their approaches to charges for transportation and their
recommendations for STS transportation charges. Among the organizations
contacted were Interstate Commerce Commission, Air Transport Associa-
tion, Military Airlift Command, Continental Airlines, and Western Motor
Traffic Bureau. It was found that tariffs have historically evolved in re-
sponse to anti-trust laws. The commercial charges are determined by
carrier/user negotiation with cognizant agency approval. The Military
Airlift Command (MAC) operates with an industrial fund provided by appro-
priation. Charges generally vary according to cargo weight and distance
carried.
After the technical work was completed on the User Charge
Analysis, additional technical assistance was given to NASA Headquarters
and NASA JSC for the purpose of supporting Headquarter's briefings and
the initiation of a JSC user charge study.
5. 1. 3 Results and Conclusions
Some of the criteria were satisfied for nearly all charge approaches.
Costs were recovered satisfactorily by forcing the revenue to be equal to
the costs. With one exception, the charge approaches selected for analysis
are rated as relatively simple to administer. Many of the simpler charge
approaches, based on weight, volume, or length of payload, failed to account
for changes in launch vehicle capability with altitude and inclination, and
therefore were unsatisfactory relative to the fair share criterion. Charging
payloads in proportion to the propellant used proved to be a complex, multi-
path computation and did not rate well relative to simplicity of administra-
tion. It was shown that the transportation of the upper stage by the Shuttle
should be charged to the payloads using an upper stage. Recovery of trans-
portation costs for each flight was the lowest risk approach relative to
recovering costs but the payload transportation costs could not be predicted
satisfactorily on this basis.
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Payload volume is important for STS charges when considering
multiple payloads. The cube rule approach was found to be best in accounting
for payload volume. (The cube rule states that a payload shall be charged
by weight or volume, depending on which is more critical relative to the
launch vehicle constraints.) The implementation is explained in the User
Charge Analysis volume of the final report for Study 2. 2.
A composite charge approach combining a unit, or minimum,
charge with a charge proportional to payload load factor proved to be the
most satisfactory relative to the seven criteria. The composite approach
rated high against the criteria when discounts were given for payloads sharing
the flight leg and payloads returning to earth. The discount for flight leg
sharing tends to encourage multiple payloads; thus, multiple payloads are
needed to maintain a high load factor for the STS, particularly on ascent
flights. The discount for payload return charges tends to encourage payload
return for reuse, thus increasing the STS load factor on the return flight
leg.
It is recommended that the composite charge approach be studied
in more detail by NASA. Factors that should be considered in such a study
are contained in the final report.
5. 2 BUSINESS RISK AND VALUE OF OPERATIONS IN SPACE
(BRAVO)
5. 2. 1 Obiective
The objective of the BRAVO effort was to develop, document, and
test a tool for the analysis of potential space users' problems.
5.2.2 Approach
The BRAVO tool provides a means for rapidly analyzing an advanced
space application such as communications, space-generated power, and
earth observations to assess its cost effectiveness. A direct comparison is
made between space and terrestrial systems accomplishing the same function
at equal risk in the Shuttle era. Because it was designed to stimulate potential
users of space in the Shuttle era into examining space-based versions of their
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applications, it normally uses Shuttle launch vehicle cost and performance
data and was not intended to provide a means of evaluating alternative future
launch vehicles. The work accomplished during FY 74 is an extension of the
BRAVO effort reported last year. The BRAVO analysis capability has been
expanded, and additional test cases have been completed for the Solar Cell
Power Satellite, a DOD communications satellite system (DSCS-II), and the
GSFC Earth Observation Satellite. The BRAVO results are being compared
with contractor study results on these space systems.
The end result of a BRAVO analysis is illustrated in Figure 5-1.
The economic advantages or disadvantages can be measured in many ways at
the end of an analysis. The cumulative cash flow over.the period of installing
and operating a particular system'to rheet an expected demand measures the
return to the user on his investment in terms of cumulative cash and also
shows the peak deficit cash flow encountered. Cash flow can be presented
in either constant dollars or current (inflated) dollars. Both are usually of
inte re st.
Cumulative e
Cash In
Minus 5 e
Cash Out
Years
Figure 5-1. Cash Flow at Equal Demand, Equal Revenue
and Equal Risk
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5.2.3 Results and Conclusions
In FY 74 the BRAVO capability for analysis of earth observations
was expanded. The techniques for mission equipment selection in the space
system analyses and the terrestrial system analyses were improved in the
earth observation area. The capability to analyze on-orbit service was
added to BRAVO. Major changes were made to satellite synthesis, STS
accommodation and traffic analysis, and space system risk and optimization
analysis in the space system analysis in order to analyze satellite design and
operation in an on-orbit service mode. The cost-effectiveness analysis
techniques were improved. Economic scenarios and predictions for long-
term projects have been put on a firm basis, utilizing work accomplished on
a subcontract to ECON, Inc. The techniques for economic analysis were
computerized.
The testing of the BRAVO capability continued. The cost effective-
ness analysis was completed for a power generating satellite using solar
cells (A. D. Little concept). The Solar Cell Power Satellite analysis tended
to validate BRAVO, since the results compared well with the NASA-sponsored
study by A. D. Little and Associates. This favorable comparison of BRAVO
and contractors' results was similar to the results of the first BRAVO test
case run in FY 73 on the Intelsats of the 1980's, in which the BRAVO results
were in general agreement with Comsat Corporation data, as reported last
year in the Study 2.4 final report.
An additional set of BRAVO analyses was initiated on 30 August
to provide NASA with data on alternate ways to use the Shuttle/Earth Observa-
tion Satellite (EOS), thereby assisting NASA in selecting the best way to
operate the EOS with the Shuttle. This analysis will be reported in ATR-74
(7342)- 1, Volume III, Part 5, upon completion.
The BRAVO tool provides NASA with a powerful and rapid means
of accomplishing space system economic analyses by comparing space systems
and terrestrial systems capable of performing the same user task.
5-6
5.2.4 Recommendations for Future Work
It is recommended that NASA set up a BRAVO analysis capability
in-house with enough independence so that unbiased, auditable analyses can
be accomplished.
5.3 STANDARDIZED SUBSYSTEM MODULE STUDY
5. 3. 1 Objective
The objective of this study was to provide NASA/MSFC with the
capability to perform capture/cost analyses of payloads constructed from
standardized. modules.
5.3.2 Approach
The definition of STS payloads for MSFC capture and cost analysis,
using The Aerospace Corporation capability transferred to MSFC in FY 73,
is currently limited to the following types of payloads: current design expend-
able, current design reusable, low-cost expendable, and low-cost reusable.
The need to analyze standardized module payloads as a potential type of
payload for the STS has been recognized for some time, but funding to do
this analysis was not available until this year.
An initial set of standardized module designs was obtained from
Study 2. 1 in March of 1974. The characteristics of these modules were
reviewed and the number of different modules reduced in order to obtain
cost reductions by increasing the number of applications of each module.
The study developed key characteristics which would be used to determine
the applicability of each module to new satellites. Four reference satellites
were then synthesized using the standardized modules to obtain the design
characteristics required for each satellite. The four reference satellites
were the Synchronous Equatorial Orbiter (SEO), the Orbiting Astronomical
Observatory (OAO), the Earth Observation Satellite (EOS), and the Domestic
Communications Satellite. The baselines for the reference satellites were
the same baselines which were used in the Lockheed Low Cost Satellite Study.
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Cost estimates and weight estimates were then made on the four reference
satellites and weight and cost factors estimated for each. These weight and
cost factors were put into a form in which they could be applied routinely as
a part of the automated capture/cost analysis techniques at MSFC.
5. 3. 3 Results and Conclusions
The gross weights of the standardized subsystem configurations
of three of the four reference satellites (OAO is the exception) fall between
those of the current design modified for reuse and the "low-cost" configu-
rations. Modularization and overkill due to standardization generally cause
increased weight, but there are cases in which the weight actually decreases.
Using standardized modules, satellites designed for servicing
on orbit can be configured in different ways to be compatible with the mission
equipment. This flexibility provides independence from the service unit
configuration selection. One configuration has all the modules facing in
one direction, allowing the mission equipment to be mounted on the sides
and opposite face. If the modules face out on the four sides, the mission
equipment can be mounted on the top and/or bottom faces. A third configu-
ration has modules mounted on a ring structure.
5. 3.4 Recommendations for Future Work
It is recommended that NASA sponsor the development of a
generalized capability to analyze the application of standardized hardware
to future spacecraft. This should result in a computerized approach to
building up satellites from standardized hardware--either components and
assemblies, or modularized subsystems.
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6. SYSTEMS COST/PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
(STUDY 2. 3)
As the space program matures into an applications industry,
greater emphasis will be placed on improving the ability to predict the effect
of program requirements on cost and schedules. Cost estimating techniques
that give greater insight earlier in the program cycle are required. As a
step in this direction, this study was initiated to identify and quantify the
interrelationships between and within the performance, safety, cost, and
schedule parameters for unmanned, automated payload programs. These
data would then be used in support of the overall NASA effort to generate
program models and methodology which would provide the needed insight
into the effect of changes in specific functional requirements (performance
and safety) on the total vehicle program (cost and schedule).
This year's study had three objectives. The first objective was
to refine and improve the cost/performance methodology which was developed
during the preceding fiscal year's study. The second study objective was
to then apply the cost/performance methodology to the following vehicle
subsystems: Stabilization and Control, Auxiliary Propulsion, Communica-
tions, Data Processing and Instrumentation, Electrical Power, Thermal
Control, and Structure. The product of this effort was the Systems Cost/
Performance Model. The third objective was to implement the Systems
Cost/Performance Model as a digital computer program which could operate
on the MSFC Univac 1108 with only minor modifications necessitated by dif-
ferences between the Aerospace CDC 7600 and the MSFC Univac 1108. The
resulting program would be used to perform initial program planning, cost/
performance tradeoffs, and sensitivity analyses and could be used for mission
model and advanced payload studies.
6. 1 APPROACH
One of the first tasks was to determine the functions performed
by each subsystem and by specific hardware types within each subsystem.
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Interfaces between subsystems determined some of the functions to be
performed. The definition of functions had to be complete, since subsystem
designs are generally related directly to the functions they are required to
pe rfo rm.
Block diagrams, consisting of equipment types used in each con-
figuration and illustrating the functions performed by the equipment, were
developed for all generally used subsystem configurations. Since there may
be an infinite number of block diagram variations, block diagrams were
established that were valid for most designs.
A design algorithm was developed which selected preconfigured
subsystem designs satisfying the input requirements. This implies that,
as part of the vehicle design algorithm, a complete set of alternative designs
has been established from which to choose. Having selected an acceptable
design, the hardware required to implement.the design is selected from
available off-the-shelf hardware listed in the data base., Obviously, the
model must be capable of differentiating between hardware components of
the same type and determining which hardware component has the character-
istics to satisfy all of the requirements. To have a workable algorithm,
the input data required to select a design and size the necessary equipment
were established. These data, which are familiar to the payload designers
(i. e., orbit altitude, pointing accuracy, satellite lifetime, reliability,
etc.) are inputted and then processed to select specific system designs.
The input data include subsystem performance requirements, interface require-
ments, and other data necessary to make design decisions.
A data base consisting of off-the-shelf hardware was established
using data for each hardware component. The data for each component con-
tains sufficient information to allow the equipment selection algorithm to
select specific pieces of equipment and to provide the necessary output data.
Cost data were based on seven specific satellite programs.
The Systems Cost/Performance Model was implemented as a
digital computer program. The program was written in the language of
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Fortran IV, as adapted to the CDC 7600 computer and the Univac 1108 com-
puter. The'program includes the Systems Cost/Performance Model and
the related data base.
Two forms of model checkout were performed. The first was
a set of computer runs to ensure that both the logic and arithmetic models
were accurate and complete and that all submodels were interfacing properly.
The second set of computer runs was limited to a few special runs, selected
for the purpose of comparing the Systems Cost/Performance Model against
other existing models and actual payload programs.
6.2 DISCUSSION
The user of the Cost/Performance Model (as currently programmed)
must supply certain program data which would normally include the payload
performance requirements as well as general information necessary to select
a payload design. The technical portion of the model consists of a two-step
process: the first step is to select subsystem configurations which are accept-
able to the user, and the second step is to select equipment from a data base
to mechanize the subsystem configuration. The reliability portion of the
model adds redundancy to the design so that the reliability requirements are
met. The resulting output of the technical model is a number of payload
designs which meet or exceed the input requirements and which are specified
at the component (assembly) level in the subsystems. The cost and schedule
to design, build, and operate each payload design are estimated by summing
up the individual cost and schedule allocations based on each end item assembly
specified as part of the particular design.
The model selects equipment for a specific design in one of three
ways:
a. Most equipment is selected from the data base on the basis of
technical performance.
b. Some equipment which cannot be differentiated on the basis of
technical performance is simply called up from the data base
on a first-called basis in order to provide a complete design
description.
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c. Certain equipment is not amenable to cataloging in the data
base, This equipment is identified and specific parameters
are determined. Examples include the wiring harness and
the Thermal Control Subsystem components.
As a result of satisfying the input performance requirements, a
finite number of designs are established by the Cost/Performance Model.
The calculated reliability of each particular design is evaluated against the
requirement provided as the model input. If it does not meet the specified
reliability level, a search for the least reliable element is initiated. Upon
identification, it is paralleled by an identical unit, and the system reliability
is recalculated. The evaluation and paralleling process continues until the
reliability exceeds the specified requirement.
The Cost Model consists of cost equations which process cost
information associated with each subsystem component. This costing tech-
nique requires each component to have cost information stored in the data
base. The Cost Model adds up the cost information for every piece of equip-
ment (component) selected from the data base. Cost Estimating Relationships
(CERs) are used to estimate the costs for six components which were not
amenable to cataloging.
The non- recurring cost for each component takes into account
redundancy and inflation. The average recurring cost for each equipment
component is adjusted to account for labor, materials, redundancy, and
inflation. If more than one unit is to be built, a learning curve is used to
account for reduced unit cost as additional quantities are built. The total
non-recurring cost is the sum of the non-recurring costs for all of the system
components. Total recurring cost is a function of the equipment quantities
and the appropriate average recurring costs. The total spacecraft cost is
obtained by summing the total recurring and non-recurring costs and then
adding in the mission equipment cost and contractor's profit.
In general, the estimates of the schedule lead times are functions
of the hardware selected by the Cost/Performance Model. The schedule
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lead times are estimated in a manner similar to that used by the Cost Modak,
The justification for such an approach lies in the fact that specific equip-
ment components provide an indication of the complexity of the system and,
hence, a measure of the time required to complete the activities associated
with the system.
6.3 RESULTS
The major accomplishment of this study was the successful
development of a Systems Cost/Performance Model which has the capability
to synthesize automated, unmanned spacecraft configurations based on the
system requirements and a list of equipments at the assembly level. In
addition, the Model estimates cost and development schedule data for each
of the configurations selected. The Model was programmed for operation
on a digital computer, successfully checked out at The Aerospace Corporation,
and put into an operational status where it was then used to make several
sample calculations on both CDC 7600 and IBM 360 computers. The program,
however, is not yet operational at MSFC.
Sample runs were made for several performance and safety require-
ments for one operational Air Force satellite program and for baseline con-
figurations of the NASA ERTS-A and OSO-I satellites. Table 6-1 compares
actual stabilization and control (S&C) subsystem weights for one of these
satellites with weights from a design generated by the Model from component
(assembly) data in the data base. Table 6-2 presents a comparison of the
cost estimates for this satellite generated by the Systems Cost/Performance
Model and by conventional subsystem CERs. The actual total program costs
were approximately 18 percent lower than those computed by the Cost/Per-
formance Model. The cost estimates produced by conventional subsystem
CERs agreed more closely with the actual costs than those generated by the
Model because the curves for the CERs passed through the actual data points
for the example Air Force satellite. In general, the current computer program
gives high cost values for spin-stabilized satellites and low values for three-
axis stabilized satellites with the cost data in the computer program. Improved
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Table 6-1. Example Satellite S&C Weight Comparison
Wt in lb.
Equipment Type Selected by Actual Satellite
Cost/Perf. Model Equipment
Despin Mechanical Assembly 21. 8 21.6
Despin Electronics Assembly 8. 5 8. 3
Valve Driver Assembly 4.1 1.4
Sun Sensor Assembly 11.2 2. 8
Nutation Damper 4.0 4.0
Gimbal Electronics Assembly 6.2 6.2
Control Timing Assembly 7.4 7.3
Bi-Axial Drive Assembly 14.3 14.3
Earth Sensor Assembly 7.3 4.1
S&C Power Converter 5. 1 None used
Table 6-2. Total Satellite Cost Estimate Comparisons
(Thousands of Dollars)
Cost/Performance Subsystem
Model CERs
DDT&E 160, 359) (61, 610)
Spacecraft 28, 059 29, 310
Mission Equipment 32, 300 32, 300
Investment (61, 571) (49, 610)
Spacecraft 41, 531 29, 570
Mission Equipment 20, 040 20, 040
Operations ( 2, 366) ( 4, 540)
Contractor Fee ( 5,037) ( 4,439)
Total (129, 333) (120, 199)
The subsystem level cost estimates were generated by the current payload
cost estimating model, PALCM.
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cost data were developed late in the study to reduce these variations but
were not included in the computer program delivered to NASA because of
insufficient time to perform the reprogramming. It is planned to accomplish
this reprogramming early in the FY 75 study.
At the same time, the model provides insight into the effect of
other variables on payload cost. Figure 6-1 presents the satellite cost esti-
mates generated by the Model as a function of payload reliability. The cost
estimates are relatively insensitive to changes in payload reliability at low
levels due to the inherent reliability of a single string system. However,
attempts to increase reliability substantially cause costs to turn upward,
reflecting the diminishing returns and increasing costs of adding redundancy.
Further increase of the payload reliability is inappropriate due to the fixed
mission equipment reliability. The model is simply pointing out that either
of two approaches are necessary to increase reliability further: (a) make the
mission equipment more reliable, or.(b) change the entire payload design to
a more reliable, but less redundant, concept. The cost curves generated by
the Model provide more insight than the current CER approaches, which are
restricted to straight-line approximations about the nominal value.
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Figure 6-1. Cost Versus Extended Life
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6.4 CONCLUSIONS
In general, the Cost/Performance Model as programmed equals
the performance of "top-down" models. The Model uses a "bottom-up"
approach, and, therefore designs the payload at the assembly level. Greater
accuracy is achieved by the very nature of the more detailed design. This
accuracy will be reflected in the cost and schedule model estimates. A second
attribute of the Cost/Performance Model is the completeness of the design
specified. Pieces of equipment are not forgotten, and redundancy is auto-
matically included in the specified design. In addition, the impact of all
subsystem interfaces and interactions is properly modeled. The net result
is a payload design which is as accurate and complete as from a pre-Phase A
study and which is available to the Cost/Performance Computer Program user
almost immediately.
Because of the detailed nature of the Model, the potential uses
of the System Cost/Performance Model exceed those for' "top-down" models.
The following uses of the model are suggested:
a. Establish specific payload designs and the related costs and
schedule to meet given requirements.
b. Determine the sensitivity of payload design, costs, and
schedules to changes in requirements.
c. Perform trade studies to identify optimal designs.
d. Identify low cost designs using a data base consisting of
standardized off-the- shelf equipment.
e. Perform modularity studies by modifying the Model to
assign equipment to modules.
The Model should become a more and more useful tool in terms of preliminary
program planning and in actual program management as it becomes more
fully developed and as the data base is expanded to include more equipments.
The current Cost/Performance Model is restricted to modeling
unmanned, automated payloads in earth orbit. More importantly, the current
Model is constrained in the range of payload designs it can generate by the
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limited number of equipments in the data base. Accuracy of the spacecraft
cost estimates is limited by the relatively small amount of cost data which
could be reduced and processed as part of this year's effort to support the
data base cost entries.
Even with these limitations, the computerized Cost/Performance
Model provides the user with a relatively complete satellite design (excluding
mission equipment) together with appropriate programmatic data in a running
time of less than two minutes. Development of the design and programmatic
data would require considerable effort if it were to be performed manually.
6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that further effort be directed towards elimi-
nating the deficiencies listed in the previous section.
In addition, the Cost/Performance Model should be operated to
the maximum extent possible to determine its overall utility to assess new
program activities. This latter recommendation is especially important
if the strengths and weaknesses of the Model are to be objectively evaluated.
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